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1. lNTRODUCTLON 
Just a few years ago, any discussion of i.nternational criminal 
lawl would have jndecd been brief. lt would speak of the historic 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribun,�ls wb.ich followed World War II, 
making various comment:> regarding their groundbreaking nature 
and some of the criticisms related thereto1 e.g., "victor's justice." 
Perhaps there would be some discussion of the tric1ls tl1at followed 
the Nuremberg Military Tribun�l ("NMT") in which judges from 
the victorious powers participated. There might follow <m 
overview of the developments in internationR] humE\ nitarian law, 
particularly the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the 1949 
Geneva Convenbons, and related treaties, as well as passing 
references to domestic proseculio.ns that applied lhis law. One 
might even make reference to the distant dream of some type of 
perm.anent international criminal court. Thus, if this article had 
been pen ned at the fifteenth anniversary of this foumnl'::; lite, it 
would have not only been necessarily short but it also would have 
painted a dismal picture of n1assive atrocities without any 
individual (\CCOttntability f.or these crimes on the international 
level. It would have been fair to say that international criminal 
law, with a few notable exceptions, existed only in theory . 
· Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow, United States Institute o( Peace ("USIP"); 
formerly United Ne1tions Assistant SL'cretMy·Gener<ll and Special Expert to the 
Secretary-Gen�ral on United 1 ations As<>istance tn the Khmer Rouge Trials; 
Deputy Chief Prosecutor, lntcrn,1tional Ctiminal Tribunal f(H. the forn1er 
Yugoslavia (" ICTY'')i Deputy Registrar, ICTY; Chef de C1binct l(i the Pn2sident, 
ICTY; Executive Dircctur, Americ.1n Bnr Association Central Et!ropean and 
Eurasian Law Initiative(" ABA-CEEU"). Thl.' \'iews e'pressed bl:rcin <m: th1iSC of 
the authe>r alone and not those of USIP. 
I While "inteTnational criminal law" is �cnerJIIv underst<Jod tu me.m the 
body of rules that prohibit inlernation::�l c.:ri;1wc;, the ter111 is u�cd here in  its 
broadest s�.::nse, with a iocus on the development of mechanisms to .:�ppl_v and 
enforce this body of law on the international kvel. 
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Over the last fifteen years, however, the picture h<.1s changed 
dramatically. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, whiie still 
important from an historical perspective, arc now a n1uch smaller 
part of the story, following the creation of ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslcwia ("lCTY") and Rwanda 
("TCTR") in the 1990s, which haw� tried hundreds of iT'ldividuals 
for war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, crimes 
againsl humanity, and genocide. Their vvork hC!S sp<rwncd other 
internationalized courts and tribunals (ofll'n referred to as hybrid 
cow:ts because they use a combination of inlcrnaliOnCll and 
national judges, prosecutors, and staff), such as Lhosc conslituted in 
Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo.2 Even more 
significantly, many governments from throughout the world caine 
together in 1998 to negoti21te and adopt the Treaty of Home, wbich 
established the International Crimin<ll Court ("ICC"), a permanent 
treaty-based court, with much wider jurisdiction than L•ther 
international tribunals over war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and (in theory) the crime of aggression+ The ICC is now 
up and runrung, with four situations under investigation and trials 
set to begin in 2009. 
These are remarkable achievements in a relatively short period 
of lime, but as these courts and tribunals h0ve grown and th12ir 
practices have developed, dif icult issues have naturally arisen. 
Some of these are technical in nature and are hardly unexpected, 
such as issues relating to what procedures are to be followed both 
during investigations and in trial. However, there are also a 
number of other issues with broad implications th3t arc likely to 
impact the ICC and possibly other jnternalional courts and 
tribunals over the long-term.. These include the emerging ''peace 
versus justice" debate, which posits that in certain circumstances 
lhc pursuit of juslice can undermine efforts to creste the conditions 
for peace. 
These debates play out in a polilical context that harkens back 
to the "victor's justice'' argument, in that, thus fur, the work of 
international courts and tribunals has focused on crimes in the 
developing ·world, primarily in Africa (e1l1 four of Lhe ICC 
situations are in this conbncnt). As a result, one hears more voices 
� r have not added the Special Tribunal fur Lebanon to this list, because as it 
is not applying international humanitarian law. Th� interesting case of the State 
Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, wl1ich is a hybrid national court trying war crimes, 
d\•es not seem to fit into this category either. 
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cn tJcJ zing the disparute tt·eatmenl of similar cr [ mes and neo­
colonialisrn. These arc importan t matters in th�mselves and 
warrc1r1t d iscussion. They may CJlso imply imporlant praclic,ll 
difficulties, clS the ICC and other international courts and tribun,1ls 
h<we no coercive powers of their own and depend primurily on the 
cooperation of slates to obtain evidence, conduct- investigations, 
and make arrests. These tensions, and how lhcv ;:ne resolved or 
not resolved, will play an important r01L' in the cffic(lcy of 
intcrnation<1l crirnit1al law in the future. lntermi ngled with these 
is�LH':'S, and ,1 possible solution to some of tbc.:.· problems that C\re 
currently being fc:�ced, is the question of what the exact relationship 
h"tween intcrnCitional C\nd domestic courts slwuld be. In other 
vvords1 using the language of the ICC Sta tute, what does 
II I . ,, ll -r cump �:mentc1r1ty rea y mean.'' 
TlK:se ,1re some of tbe critical issues thnt the lCC (and 
intcrnCltion:�l criminal law generally) faces today, c1nc.l its response 
to these ch,1llengcs will be crucial as we enter the next phase of 
dc\'\.�lopmcnt in this field. Will international crim inal law see 
consolidRtion of its rapid development over the post fi[teen years? 
Or, will we see possible retrcnchn1ent and cmolher period, no 
doubl less extreme than the long gap between the NMT and the 
establishn1ent of the lCTY, where tbese institutions and 
international criminal law take a back seat and fail to live up to 
their promise? 
This is the landscape with which practitioners and interested 
parties in the field of international criminal law must grapple in 
the coming years. 
'I THE PAST: DiSTANT AND RECE\IT 
2 .. l Fru111 Nurc111bag tu t/u; lCTY 
As noted above, international crinlinal lcrw has developed at a 
rapid rale over the last fifteen years. Prior to the establishment of 
the lCTY in 1993, there were few developments on the 
intcrnationc11 �1l,1ne in the application of that ]aw in the wake of the 
:Jec R('mc St;-�tute of the International Criminal Court, arts. t, 17(1)(a), July 
17, 1998, 21�7 U.f'J,TS. 90 (�tilting the1t the JCC is iJ1tend0d to "complement" 
natium1l jurisdictions, and "d case is inadmissible [before the lCC] where [t)he 
case is being investigated nr prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it, 
t1nless the state i� unwilling or unable genuinely to (any out the investigation or 
pros�cutit'ln"). 
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Nuremberg ancll'okyo Tribunals. However, it is worth noting that 
these tribunals, p8rticularly Lhe NMT,4 were a m.ajor breakthrough 
in that senior political and tnilitary leaders were brought to justice, 
in proceedings that were largely seen as fair und in accordance 
wilh applicable st"ndards, for atrocities that they had ordered, 
directed , or committed. Jn addition, important IL"gal principles 
were enunc iateLi either in the iT .founding documents (a:: was the 
case with the London Charter) or by the tribLHl.Jis themselves; 
including establishing cri n'les agajnst humanity, which becr1me Cl 
cornerstone of intt·rnational humanitarian law, one! striking down 
the defense of sup<:rior orders. 
fbus, these prL)::iecutions and related rroceed ings under 
Control Council Order No. 10, in which intcrnationc�l judges and 
proscclttors particip<1tcd in otherwise national trials, represen ted .:1 
significcmt step forw.:1rd in creating a fr<lmework of interni'llional 
crimin;:d law, partintlarly given past efforts Lhat fc1ilcd i.n this 
rcgcud (such as lhc Versailles Treaty which provided for the 
prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm 11). However, t11ese efforts were 
subject lo a number of criticisms as well. These trials were decried 
by some as "victor's justice," i_n that the crimes of those who lost 
the vvars vvere adjudged by representatives of those who won, with 
American, french, British, and Russian judges sitting in judgment 
of German officers, but no one from the victorious allies was 
subject to any similar iustice mechanisms. Another criticism was 
that ex post fnctv laws and legal principles were applied at 
Nurernberg and Tokyo in that, for example, "crirnes against 
humanity'' did not exist as a binding legal concept prior to the 
adoption of the London Charter. 
While these and other criticisms have at least sorne validity, 
nonetheless the e1chievemcnts of Nuremberg were tangible t1nd 
important The trials shovved that leaders could be held to account 
for their lawless acts and tl1at, at least in the face of mass a.tTocities 
the intcrnation<'tl community could establish judicial mechanisms 
that were seen as fair in tbem.selves. This was a result far superior 
to either lookjng the other vvay or sirnply executing these lee�dcrs as 
Winston Churchill, among others, advocated. 
I For J \'cli'iety ot rcasuns, the To!-:yo Tt·ibun<ll is subject to more sust0ined 
and justified critici"m than its counterpart. Sec, e.g., R. john Pritchard, The 
lntL'mntioual Military Tribunal for till! Far £a5/ ond lis Colltei11J.IMI1r}i Re�uwm.:t'S, 1·19 
MILL. I<EV. 25 (1995) (comparing the IMT for the Far East with other international 
courts). 
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Despite the work of the 1 MT, the following almost fifty years 
did not see any establishn1ent of further international criminal 
tribun.als or courts. There were irnportant developments in the 
law, which included the adoption of the Geneva and Genocide 
Conventions as well as a number of other groundbreaking treaties, 
including, the Torture Convention, and there were some scattered 
domestic prosecutions based on these laws and principles, such as, 
the Adolph Eichmann trial. ln the 1980s and 1990s, a number of 
countries, prirnarily in Latin America but also in South Africa, 
employed non-judicial mechanisms, in the form of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions, to address accountability issues. 
While these mcchcmisms varied in terms of their procedures, they 
did not attribute criminal responsibility, so they are technically 
outside the scope of internationa.l criminal law.s Nonetheless, they 
did represent a growing public movement and awareness that 
mass atrocities in any society must be addressed, and can not 
simply be swept under the proverbial carpet and ignored. In this 
sense, these mechanisms are important in setting the stage for the 
next developments in international criminal law. 
This next stage came with the creation of the ICTY in 1993 by 
the United Nations Security Council. 
2.2. Tlze ad !we Tribunals and other l!lterrzationalized Courts 
During the early 1990s, a series of wars broke out in what was 
the unraveling country of Yugoslavia. The savagery of these wars 
was on full display on international television stations, such as 
CNN, giving immediacy to the numerous atrocities committed 
during the conflicts. The United ations and the European Union 
struggled to deal with the unfolding humanitarian disaster and to 
bring an end to the conflicts, which only stopped in 1995 with the 
Dayton Accords (the Kosovo conflict was to emerge in 1999 and 
another conflict in Macedonia in 2001). In the midst of the conflict, 
the United Nations Security Council decided to create the ICTY the 
first international tribunal since Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
The Security Council acted pursuant to its powers under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which provides it with 
mandatory and legally binding powers to take steps to ensure 
peace and security. By acting in this mC\nner, the Security Council, 
s It should be noted that in South Africa, there was a judicial effect in that 
anmesty was granted in exchange for truthful testimony. 
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at least in IPgJI ti·h�ory, clothed tl1e fCTY with n1 c1ndatory and 
binding legc:\1 powers. Moreover, in the lCTY Stc1tut c; the Security 
Council provided tha.t the l CTY had primacy over na tional courts; 
that is, nationetl prosecu tori<ll authorLties had to give way to the 
ICTY when the latler dt>cided to exercise its jmisdiction. The ICTY 
was also given a broJd n.1nndate OVt'r all vvnr crimes, crimes agai nst 
hu manity/ c"lnd genocide (but not C'lggressiCln) in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia frun.1 199"1 forw<m::l. The court itselr is current ly 
located in rhe Hague, t\ethcrlands. 
The esta blishment of tht:> fCTY Web a revolutionary 
development, not only due to the swc�pin g powers it WC\S given 
over national authorities, but <1lso bcc.:tuse lhe rribunal was a truly 
internat ional court: created by the United N(ltions, v.rilh judges, 
prosecutors, and staff recruited fr01n all pmts of the world. This 
latter approa ch addressed, e�t least in part, the past arguments of 
'' victor' s justice." I low�ver, a new argument, arose: VVhy 
Yugoslavi a and not other countries? Should 110t other perpetrators 
be subject to justice? Was a fumiwmenta I principle of justice being 
i gnored by the limitation of tbe Tribunal to a speci fic country and a 
specific time period? 
Even horn a more practical level, the ICTY faced enormous 
obstacles. While it had significan t powers on paper, i t  was not 
clear how it was to conduct investigations and rnake arrests il1. a 
war zone, pcHticularly when it had no police force or mea ns of 
coercion. This n':!alit-v became starker �whe11 Tribunal offjcials .I 
fmmd the Security Counc il unwilling to tclke more than 
perfunctory steps lo enforce its orders and requests. Given these 
rea lities, many vievved the !CTY as simply a '1 fig leaf' for the 
Securily Council's t21ilme to c-1ct to stop the conflict. 
Shortly after the cre<�tion of the lCTY, genocide occurred in 
R \.va..nda where son1c ROO,OOO Tutsis <:md moderate Hutus were 
killed in a few shor l months in 1994. The Security Council a cted 
again pursuant lo its pOv\'ers under Chaplcr VII of t he United 
N 21tions Charter Glnd created the ICTR, which has a similar 
mandate and struc ture clS ICTY, wi th jurisdiction limited to 
Rwanda in 1994. It is currently lo..:ated in Arusha, Tanzcmia. It 
faced many of the Senne issues as the lCTY in terms of lack of 
coercive powers, c"llbeit in a differen t context. 
These ad hoc rribullc.liS have held reed achievements; where 
many individllals have been brought to just ice, a11d they h3ve been 
able to overcome many obstacles. For example, th e lCTY has been 
able to arrest or otherwise dispose of the cases of all but lwo of the 
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161 individuals it indicted. The tria.ls conducted have been seen to 
be fair, and many victims have felt a rneasure of justice. The 
tribunals have also been able to make international criminal law 
into a tangible area of international lavv and have created a strong 
cadre of practitioners in th.is emerging field of law. 
On the other hand, the tribunals b,wc been subject to a nqriad 
of criticisms. Perhaps the most telling of these is that  they are 
expensive and slow and have no rea! connection to the affected 
com.munities, because they are far a\vay fron1 the locations where 
the crimes have been comn1itted. Moreover, their in1pact on, and 
support of, the developm.ent of local judicial irtfre1structure has 
been lirnited. 
ln response to these criticisrns, ·which clearly have at least some 
merit, the United Nations has taken 0 different  approach when 
mass atrocities have occu.rred in other contexts by creating hybrid 
tribunals or cou.rts that are located iu ::;itu. In Sierra Leone, the 
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone established a 
hybrid court in Freetown that applied not only international 
htunanitarian law but a lso the domestic crirninal law of Sierra 
Leone. In Cambodia, a similar model was followed to try the 
crimes of the Khmer Rouge, although the U.N. posi tion is much 
less robust than in Sierra Leone. Moreover, U. N. transitional 
authorities i n  East Timor and Kosovo also followed the hybrid 
model by utilizing international judges and prosecutors working 
together with national judges and prosccu tors; in the case of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the national authorities took a similar course 
working closely with the Office of the High Representative. 
While each of these tribunals and courts h.Cive positive and 
negative attributes, it is clear that the arrangetnents regarding 
hybrid courts were intellded to address the probl em of distance by 
placing the court in the country where the crimes were comn1itted. 
This allowed greater access by the 21ffected public to the 
proceedings and also aJlo�wed victims to feel closer to the 
proceedings. The costs were also substantially reduced by 
employing national staff and in lovver cost environments than The 
Hague. Finally, the hybrid model W<�S an attempt to leverage the 
skills and knowledge of international judges and prosecutors to the 
benefi t  of their national counterparts viu skills and capacity 
building. 
Thus, putting the ICC to one side for a moment, a patchwork of 
international and internationalized hybrid courts and judicial 
institutions have emerged over the last fifteen years. In some 
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cases, they have sat alongside Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (i.e., Sierra Leone). Of course, such a patchwork of 
courts does not ansvver the critics' argument that justice is selective 
and disparate, but the record of these institutions shows that 
justice can be done in a wide range of specific cases. These courts 
and tribunals have tried high-ranking senior leaders for violations 
of international criminal law, a d evelopment that would h.ave been 
unimaginable just a few years ago. Thus, presidents (Taylor, 
Milosevic, Karadzic) and prime ministers (Kambanda), previously 
thought to be immune, have been or arc being tried for mass 
crimes. t-,1Ioreover, following the Pinochet case i n  the United 
Kingdom, it is also clear that doctrines providing for the immunity 
oi heads of state have been consigned to the dustbin. Therefore, 
between these international and internationalized courts and the 
application of the laws in some states providing for universal 
jurisdiction over certain crimes (e.g., genocide, crimes against 
humanity), internation<'ll criminal law is now an essential part of 
the fabric of international law and applied by various international 
and domestic courts. 
3. THE ICC AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
While all of the courts and tribunals discussed above have 
played an in1.portant role in establishing and enforcing 
international criminal law, the most significant development in the 
field has been the creation of the ICC. The negotiation of the Rome 
Statute took a number of years to come to fruition and can fairly be 
seen as a post-Cold War phenomenon. It clearly could not have 
been est8blished during the Cold War, and, similarly, it would 
have been much more difficult for the ICC Treaty to have been 
negotiated even a few years later in the post-Septentber 11 
environment. The Rome Statute arose during a period of post­
Cold \Nar optimism and renewed faith in international institutions. 
Moreover, the pioneering vvork of the ad hoc Tribunals must also 
be recognized, as their work, while fraught with difficulty, had 
shown that such institutions could work and conduct fair trials in a 
truly international context. 
In many respects, the Rome Statute is a conservative document, 
�md the powers of tl1e court and the prosecutor are much more 
circumscribed than in the ad hoc Tribunals. The ICC prosecutor is 
subject to substantial judicial supervision and the court has no 
jurisdiction at all unless the domestic authorities are "unwilling or 
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unable" to prosecute the crin1es, vvhich is referred to as the 
"complementarity" principle. Therefore, the ICC is the reverse of 
the situation of the ICTY and iCTR which have primacy over local 
jurisdictions. Moreover, while the ICC may obtain jurisdiction in 
several ways, including by Security Council referral, State Party 
referral, or by an investigation by the prosecutor pursuant to his or 
her limited proprio niotu powers in certain circumstances, the 
Security Council is in a position to cedi a temporary halt to these 
proceedings should it deem it necessary for reasons of peace 2md 
security. There are a number of other restrictions on the 
prosecutor's and the court's 21bility to rnount investigations and 
proceedings as well, which are in any event limited to natio.nals of 
State Parties to the Rome Treaty or to crimes committed in those 
countries' territory (except in th:.; case of a Security Council 
referral). 
The ICC Statute was overwhelmingly adopted in Rome in 1998, 
and it quickly won sufficient approval to come into force as of July 
1998. This was a rem.arkable achievement. Hm.vever, despite its 
widespread acceptance, the ICC was actively opposed by the 
United St21tes, which after President CLinton initially signed the 
treaty, then (under the Bush Administration) "unsigned" the treaty 
and launched an ideological and shameful campaign to undermine 
and attack the court. Fortunately, over time U.S. policy appears to 
have gradually shifted to an u.nstated tolerance for the ICC with 
the United States playing 21 neutral or positive role in the Security 
Council's referral of the DMfur situation to the ICC and the 
subsequent issues related to the referral. We can hope that a more 
positive approach will emerge with the Obama administration and. 
that at some point the United States itself will join the ICC. 
As the ICC developed as an institution, it has faced, is facing, 
and will face a number of difficult issues in the future. These 
difficulties seem to fall into three general categories: (1) 
cooperation issues; (2) the Peace versus Justice debate and 
questions of selection of prosecutions; and (3) applying 
complementarity and the relationship between the ICC and 
national judicial authorities. Obviously, the ICC operates in a 
cornpiex political and judicial environment, but these are the issues 
that strike me as the primary ones. Given that the ICC is or will be, 
with the impending closure of the ICTY and ICTR, the primary 
mechanism for the application of international criminal law for the 
foreseeable future, we can also say these will, ipso facto, be the 
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principal issues (foreseeable at the moment) that vvill arise in the 
field of international criminal law. 
In tenns of coopera tion, the ICC, like the ad hoc Tribunals, has 
no means of coercion Cit its disposal. Therefore, it must rely on the 
cooperation of states and international organizations, for assistance 
in carrying out its investigations and making a rrests. 'Without 
cooperation from the relevant states, its work can be stymied. One 
area where there have already been issues is the h<:1ndling of 
confidential inforrn<�tion from the United Tations and other 
sources that h<�d been provided to the prosecution but not to the 
defense in the Luhnngo case, leading the trial charnber to threaten 
dismissal of the case. This crisis has novv been averted, but such 
technical issues involving cooperation are likely to arise again. 
However, in rny view, such problems can be worked through and 
are part of the difficulties that international courts dealing with 
establishing cases against senior military and political leaders will 
always face. 
A tnore serious problem. occurs when the national authorities 
in the place the crimes were comrnitted refuse cooperation and/ o r  
refuse t o  make arrests. Tb.e ICTY faced this situation with respect 
to Serbia and to a lesser extent with Croatia. For much of its life, 
the ICTY had a long list of fugitives, including n1any senior 
leaders, but over time this has been whittled away, primarily as a 
result of political and economic pressure exerted by the European 
Union. In the cases of both Croatia and Serbia, the benefits of 
joining the European Union and the drawbacks of not joining were 
sufficient to win cooperation, particularly on the issue of arrests. 
The ICC is in a more difficult situation: all of its current cases 
are in Africa, which does not have a regional set of institutions in 
any way corn.parablc to the European Union. It is being 
stonewalled in Darfur by the Government of Sudan. These types 
of non-cooperation issues wm always plague the ICC; they will 
require patience and cunning on the part of the lCC as well as  
innovative te1ctics and strategy. 
One strategy that the lCC has embraced in the face of such non­
cooperat.ion is the concept of self-referra l - allowing states to refer 
their own situations to the ICC. Thus, in the case o.f Uganda, it 
referred the situation regarding the Lord's Resistance Arn1y in its 
· territorv to the ICC. This vvas then followed bv similar self-, -
referrals by the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central 
African Republic. 
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vVhile the ath·action of self-referrals is clear in terms of 
cooperation., as the refcrdng state is 1.1bviously pl�:mning to 
cooperate w i th lCC if it is will ing to refer itself, this  process has 
been severely criticized on several fronts.l' First, self-referrals were 
not the intention of the state referral process established in the 
Rome Statute, which provides for one state to refer another ststc. 
More importantly, it is argued th21t such self-referral turns 
c0mplemcnlarity on its head, as the stutc rather than the court 
determines whether it is in a position lo prosecute. fn the Ugc1nda 
situation, it is not that the Ugandan courts lack the requisite 
capacity - the test in the Rome Slatute, but rather that the 
governrnent could nol effect an arrest which the ICC was not 
created to handle. The lCC thus a l lows such governments to 
establish the court's priorities rather them following the norms 
established in the Rome Statute. Finally, it is argued that the self­
referring government is, in essence, pointing the finger a t  rebel 
groups and tl1us trying to avoid an investigation itself a.nd that the 
ICC is caught in this web by agreeing to such self-referrals. 
Regsrdless of whether one accepts these arguments, it is dear 
that state cooperation problems have led to the novel approach of 
self-referrals and that issues of cooperation or non-cooperation wil l  
continue to significantly impact the ICC. 
A second set of issues arises out  of the ''Peace versus Just ice" 
debate, which has emerged from the Uganda and Darfur situations 
pending before the ICC. fn essence, it is argued that by insisting 
on the primacy of ICC investigations, peaceful resolutions of 
disputes can be discouraged, as leaders facing war crimes 
investigations or charges are unl ikely to agree to make peace, 
because they have litt le incentive lo do so. Thus, in this 
construction, peace, along with itmocent people and peacekeepers, 
can be endangered by a n  insistence on justice, and, therefore in 
some instances justice efforts must give way to attempts to bring 
about peace. 
Concerns e1bout such issues led to the inclusion of Article 16 .in 
the ICC Statute, which pnwides that the Security Council can cause 
the ICC to defer an investigation or proceedings for a period of one 
" See WILLic\t\1 A. SCH:\U:\S, Fir�t Prost!Cittinlls at tile lnlanali!llltll CriJJii11nl Ct•urt, 
111 CRIME..<:; AND 1 -lUi'vlr\:-J RIGHTS: ESSAYS 0� THE Dc,\Tll Pt:i\:ALTY, }UST:CI:. AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY, 375, 392-,!01 (2008) (arguing thnl self-reierr,ll was n.either 
cHlticipat�d by the. dr<1fters of the Rome Statute 110r is i t  lhe best way for the lCC to 
proceed}. 
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year, which can be renewed. This provision has been discussed in 
the Darfur situation, with considerable support in the Security 
Council for such a deferral. 
In many ways this debate is based on a faulty premise: 
continued failure to address past crimes does not lead to peace but  
rather to more conflict. However, one must be cognizant that there 
are a number of not unreasonable voices who have argued that in  
specific s ituations, pushing for justice at certain stages can 
undermine efforts for peace. While these argun1ents are not 
persuasive to this writer, they are arguments that w i l l  continue to 
arise and wi l l  need to be add ressed. Moreover, these lead to 
questions about the prosecutor's proper role in determining when 
to investigate. I s  i t  a straightforward legal decision, based solely 
on the evidence and the gravity of the crimes committed? Or 
should, political and pragn1atic considerations, such as the effect 
such investigations will  have on peace and stability of a country or 
region be factored into the equation? While we rnay d isagree with 
the idea that  justice should ever be sacrificed, it is clear that  these 
questions will continue to arise and that they w i l l  present a set of 
long-term issues that the ICC and proponents of international 
justice will need to contend with. 
Another issue that is emerging is that the ICC's four situations 
are in Africa, while other situations such as Chechnya remain 
beyond the ICC s reach. This raises a corollary to the "victor's 
justice" argument; that is, justice for weak countries and not for the 
strong. The establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals ,,vith their 
limited jurisdictions, of course, raised this issue as well.  
The establishment of the ICC has obviously widened the 
jurisdiction of international courts well beyond that of the nd hoc 
Tribunals, to say nothing of the NMT. Nonetheless, while many 
African sta tes have joined the fCC, nwch of the rest of the vvorld, 
including such powerful countries as the United States, Russia, and 
China have not as yet ratified the Rome Treaty. Thus, in some 
cases a l leged crimes in weaker countries may end up being 
prosecuted, either because those countries have ratified the Rome 
Statute or because, as in the case of Darfur, tb.e Security Council 
has referred the situation and the country has no right of. veto in 
the Security Council. It is, therefore, true that even with the ICC, 
citizens of a country with the right of Security Council veto can 
and probably do avoid prosecution whereas similar crimes m 
another country can be and probably have been prosecuted. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/9
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This situation is, of course, a violation of the principle of equal 
tn�a tmcn l. Nonetheless, it is not a ste� tir si l Llcl tion, as vve have 
moved from a situntion where on ly a few ye(trS ngo there was no 
possibility of an i nt�rna tiona l prosecntion to the current situa tion 
�vvhcrc over one hundred countries arc subject to the ICC's 
ju ri.;diction, with more ratifications coming Cl, ti me passes. Many 
of these countries arc significant powers, includ ing the United 
Kingdom, France, Brazil, and South AfriCt't. ThNcfore, given the 
nature of the critTICS there is a persuasive arsument thJt we should 
not mc1kc "the perfect the enemy of the good" but that more wc,rk 
shou ld go in to achieving an even broadt>r !:->Ctlpc for tbe lCC. 
Nonetheless, this w i l l  be L1 contin uing issue th,lt faces the ICC for 
th0 foreseeable fu ture. 
A broader and m.o re fundamental issue thilt the ICC needs to 
address is thCit of complementarity. As noted above, under the ICC 
Statute, Lhc rcc Gl ll only exercise i ts jurisdiction in cases where lhe 
nilli0nal authorit ies cannot or wi ll not investigdtc and prosecute 
thl' applicable crimes. Hence the purpose of the ICC is to 
complement, not supersede national juri�d ictions. Thus, the court 
m11st make a decision whether this complementarity principle he�s 
been respected before the situation or case is ndmissible at the rcc. 
This question involves an application of the releva nt legal 
principles and rules. However, complementarity raises another set 
of questions: what is the ICC's role w ith respect to assisting slates 
in bringing their judicial systems up to a standard where they can 
prosecute cri mes under the lCC Statute? Moreover, how are 
serious crin1es that do not meet the prosecu tor'-; grav ity threshold 
requ irements to be hClndled? For example, the fCC might well 
dccick Lo prosecu te the general , but wha t hE1ppens to the capt-a in 
who a lso comm itted serious cri mes? 
These difficult issues of complementarity, which some call 
" positive complementarity" have yet to be addressed. While this is 
understandable given the s ignificant problems fc1cing the ICC 
these are issues thal arc likely to become more pressing as the ICC 
conducts more investigations and obtains more and more evidence 
c1nd information. What relationship will exist between nationcll 
prosecuting authori ties ciJ1d courts and the ICC? 
There e�re some ind ica t ions from tlw ICTY how such " posit i ve 
complementarity" might work. The lCTY ft..) LJ nd that its case load 
was too great, particularly in view of its pla ns to tinish its work i n  
a timely maru1er. As the jud icial authorities and i nstitu t ions 
recovered following Lhe conflict and their capacity increased, the 
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l CTY transferred <1 number of low and mid-level cases to national 
courts, which dt:'veloped specia l ized war crimes chambers to deal 
with these cases. Most of these cases went to the Ste�le Court of 
Bosnia-[ Ie.rzeguvina, \-Vhich ilst'l r is a national hybrid court, <:llld, 
vvilh n1onitoring by the Organ ization for Security and Coopera tion 
in Europe, the experiment vvas successful .  Moreover, other 
methods of cooperation vvere developed to provide files, dossiers, 
and investigative mL1tcrials to national prosecutors to develop their 
own cases. These prosecutors were also given access to the ICTY 
prost:cu tor's non-confidential electronic databases, and trn i n i n g  
was provided lo prosecutors and judges. 
While the situation in the former Yugoslavia is quite d ifferent 
from those wh ich the ICC is currently investigating, and these 
methods were developed more i n  reaction to time pressure th.m <l 
positive vision oi complementarity, they are instructive cmd bear 
further study. l n  clny C\'enl, i f  lhc> ICC is to m<:1ke a broader in'Lpact 
than simply holding a l imited number of trials in The Hague, i t  
will need to develop this concept o f  "positive complen1entarity." 
In my view, it is the key question for international crimimd l<:1w 
and international justice generally during the next phase of irs 
impx-essive forward march. 
-!. CONCLliDlNG REMARKS 
The above discussion merel v outlines this author's views of the .· 
principal developments in the field of international criminal law 
over this journnl's life, sl ightly stretching beyond its thirty years 
because of the long f21llow period between tbe NMT and the 
este�blishm.cnt of the fCTY. \1\fhat is clear is that this f.ie]d of .law has 
rocketed from being a matter of theory, dreams, and hopes to the 
forefront of intern.1tional !e�w. This fact no doubl stctns frnm ,  
variety of developments cotu1ected both to the end of lhc Cold War 
and to mass commLmicc1tions (the "CNN effect''), but also springs 
from something n1ore ete rn a l :  tl1e desire to say 1'no" to those who 
would visit m21ss destruction nnd mjsery on thei r fel lo"" human 
beings. While many issues cmcl problems lie ahead for this field of 
law, thankfu l l y  there is no tur ning back. 
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